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ABSTRACT 
Current account deficits have caught the public’s attention as they have contributed to the European debt crisis. 
However, surpluses also constitute an issue as a deficit in any country must be financed through a surplus in 
another country. In 2013, Germany, now the world’s largest surplus economy, registered a record high US$273 
billion surplus. This paper looks at what accounts for Germany’s surplus, revealing that the major driving factors 
include strong global demand for quality German exports, domestic wage restraint, an undervalued single 
currency, high domestic savings rate and interest rate convergence in the euro area. This paper echoes the US 
Treasury’s view that a persistent German surplus makes it harder for the eurozone as a whole and the southern 
peripheral economies in particular to recover from the current financial crisis by imposing a Europe-wide 
“deflationary bias” through pushing up the exchange rate of the euro, exporting feeble German inflation and 
projecting its ultra-tight macroeconomic policies onto crisis economies.  This paper contends that Germany’s 
trade surplus is likely to endure as Germany and other eurozone countries uphold diverging views on the nature 
of the surplus engage in a blame-game amidst a sluggish rebalancing process. Prizing the surplus as a reflection of 
hard work and economic competitiveness, German authorities urge their southern eurozone colleagues to 
undertake bold structural reforms to correct the imbalance, while the hand-tied governments in crisis-stricken 
economies call on Germany to do its “homework” by boosting German demands for European goods and 
services.       
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THE DRIVERS OF CURRENT ACCOUNT SURPLUS IN 
GERMANY AND THE POLITICS OF REBALANCING 
IN THE EUROZONE1 
JI XIANBAI JASON2 
 
1. Introduction 
In 2013, Germany ran a current account surplus of 
€206 billion ($273 billion) 3 , or 7.4% of gross 
domestic product (GDP). It has leapfrogged China 
as the world’s largest surplus economy since 2012 
in nominal terms (US Treasury Department 2013). 
This record high surplus in the history of modern 
Germany, greater than 6% – a surplus ceiling 
specified in the European Union’s Macroeconomic 
Imbalance Procedure – by a significant margin, was 
achieved against the background of a sluggish 
Europe-wide economic recovery from the financial 
and sovereign debt crises that swept across the 
prosperous continent in 2009.  
This unprecedented current account surplus 
unleashed a vast sea of denunciations. In October 
2013, the US Department of the Treasury (2013) 
issued a report starkly condemning Germany as a 
threat to the global economy. The Wall Street 
Journal called Germany the new trade-surplus 
“boogeyman” haunting Europe (Talley 2014). The 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) was quick to 
                                                        
1 An earlier version of this paper was presented at the 2015 
European Union Centre Asia-Pacific Research Workshop 
jointly organised by Yeungnam University EU Centre and Jeju 
National University’s Law and Policy Research Institute in Jeju 
Province, Republic of Korea, on 5-7 February 2015. The paper 
was awarded the Grand Prix Best Presentation Award.     
2 Ji Xianbai Jason is a PhD candidate at the S. Rajaratnam 
School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological 
University and an Associate Fellow at the European Union 
Centre in Singapore. The views and opinions expressed in 
this working paper are those of the author alone and do not 
necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the 
European Union, EU Centre in Singapore, or RSIS. Any 
shortcomings or errors are solely the author’s. 
3 Germany's current account surplus is likely to have hit a 
new record of $285 billion in 2014 (Reuters 2015).  
join in the criticism, rebuking Germany for delaying 
European economic revitalisation (Parkin and 
Donahue 2013). Taking a more dispassionate 
stance, the European Union (EU) released an in-
depth review suggesting that “[a]lthough the 
current account surpluses do not raise risks similar 
to large deficits, the size and persistence of the 
current account surplus in Germany deserve close 
attention” (European Commission 2014). 
This paper seeks to address the following three 
intriguing questions: What are the drivers of 
Germany’s high level of current account surplus? 
Whether, and how, has the national surplus 
amassed by Germany imposes a systemic strain on 
the eurozone economy? And why is the imbalance 
not successfully tackled given the close policy 
coordination in the EU? 
This paper is organised as follows: Section 2 
presents an overview of Germany’s current 
account balance. Section 3 dissects the surplus and 
identifies five major drivers – strong international 
demand for German capital goods, domestic wage 
restraint, undervalued single currency, high 
domestic savings rate and interest rate 
convergence towards German rate in the eurozone 
– that account for the increasing surplus. Section 4 
elaborates on the spill-over effect of the German 
surplus on the eurozone economy and makes the 
observation that, due to a sharp divergence of 
views regarding the nature of the surplus between 
Chancellor Angela Merkel’s government and their 
EU counterparts, a symmetrical, synchronised 
rebalancing adjustment requiring concerted efforts 
from both surplus and deficit economies is difficult 
to realise in the short term. These findings will be 
summarised in the concluding remarks of Section 5. 
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2. Germany’s current account balance 
There are two ways to define and therefore 
understand current account balance. Current 
account balance can be defined as the difference 
between exports and imports of goods and 
services4 (Krugman, Obstfeld, and Melitz 2012). A 
current account surplus, also known as trade 
surplus, implies an excess of exports over imports. 
Since in an open economy the total inflow of funds 
that is not used for domestic purposes flows 
outbound to accumulate claims on foreign assets 
(Deutsche Bundesbank 2014); the current account 
balance, also referred as net foreign investment in 
this context, equates to the difference between 
domestic savings and investment.   
Historically speaking, current account deficits have 
been fairly rare in Germany; instead surpluses 
have been the norm of Germany’s external 
account (Figure 1). Germany ran a balanced 
current account for approximately four decades 
                                                        
4 Current account balance is also defined as the balance of 
trade in goods and services plus income and current transfer 
payments (Stutely 2010a). In the case of Germany, the latter 
two components are negligible vis-à-vis trade balance; 
therefore no definitional discussion is necessary in this 
paper.   
after World War II before the account dipped into 
the negative territory in the 1980s. The deficit 
soon gave way to a sustained period of surplus and 
it was not until the reunification of Germany which 
necessitated reconstructions of massive scale in 
the former East Germany that the figure plunged 
into the red for another decade (Ma and McCauley 
2013; Deutsche Bundesbank 2014). After economic 
restructuring and several policy reforms the figure 
oscillated back into surplus in the 2000s. The 
introduction of the common currency, the euro, in 
1999 boosted Germany’s ballooning surplus 
further. The figure surged to $247.7 billion in 2007 
before the crisis hit but it soon bounced back and 
reached a historical high of $273.4 billion in 2013. 
It deserves attention that Germany maintained a 
positive current account balance throughout the 
global and European financial crises, leaving it 
under attack that “Germany’s anaemic pace of 
domestic demand growth and dependence on 
exports have hampered rebalancing at a time 
when many other euro-area countries have been 
under severe pressure to curb demand and 
compress imports in order to promote 
adjustment”(US Treasury Department 2013).  
Source: OECD 
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Put in the global context, Germany’s current 
account surplus is also extraordinary (Figure 2) 
given the fact that most of the industrialised 
economies, notably the US, run current account 
deficits.  In addition, unlike Germany, nearly all 
major surplus economies have their external 
surplus shrunk significantly in the aftermath of the 
financial crises. The previous forerunner of the 
global trade surplus race and hitherto the sole 
comparable economy in terms of the magnitude of 
external surplus is China5.  China’s trade surplus 
was above 10% of GDP in 2007 and reached $420.6 
billion in 2008. However, China’s surplus has been 
substantially trimmed down. In 2013, it was 
narrowed to just 2% of GDP primarily thanks to its 
proactive economic rebalancing policies aiming at 
exploiting the huge potential of its domestic 
consumers’ market. Germany’s current account 
                                                        
5  A more detailed comparative study of Germany’s and 
China’s current account surpluses can be found in Ma and 
McCauley (2013).  
surplus transcends that of China and is more than 
three times larger than China’s as a share of 
national GDP (6.9% versus 2.0%) now. Germany 
has continued to cling on to its export industry 
while China has begun an attempt to adjust its 
export-led development model to ameliorate over-
dependence on increasingly volatile overseas 
markets when the swings of demand and instance 
of economic crisis have increased.            
3. Main drivers of Germany’s surplus 
In explaining the origin of an economy’s trade 
surplus, the traditional school of thought – 
mercantilism – prescribes that the surplus country 
in question must have resorted to market-
distorting measures to protect import-competing 
domestic industries and/or subsidise export-
competing sectors. In contemporary international 
economics, a common instrument of (neo) 
mercantilist policy is an actively managed currency 
in which the value is kept below market 
Source: OECD 
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determined rate to make their exports competitive.  
However, Germany, as a member of the Eurozone, 
no longer has the autonomy to devalue its 
currency as the monetary authority now lies with 
the European Central Bank. Germany is also known 
for its dedication to free market economic 
ideologies (Prestowitz 2012). Questions therefore 
arise as to what drives Germany’s large and 
persistent trade surplus? If Germany indeed 
pursues some form of (neo) mercantilist policies, 
what does mercantilism with German 
characteristics consist of?  
According to the definition of current account 
balance – the difference between exports and 
imports and that between domestic savings and 
investment, five factors are proposed to explain 
why German exports exceed imports and why 
savings outpace investment in a chronic manner, 
especially after the launch of the euro. They are, 
namely, strong international demand for German 
capital goods leading to strong exports; domestic 
wage restraint that enhances export 
competitiveness and suppresses consumption; an 
undervalued single currency that gives Germany an 
edge in international markets; high domestic 
savings rates; and last but not least, interest rate 
convergence towards low German rate in the 
eurozone that has facilitated the outflow of 
German savings into the southern European 
economies. Each of these five factors will be 
discussed in detail in the remainder of this section.  
3.1 Strong international demand for German goods 
Deutsche Bundesbank, Germany’s central bank, 
reconciled in its 2013 Annual Report that a 
significant portion of its trade surplus is 
attributable to imbalances in cross-border 
merchandise trade, which amount to an average 
level of 6.75% of GDP over the past decade  
(Deutsche Bundesbank 2014). While imports have 
been growing at a relatively modest speed, there is 
a continuous surge in German exports, and this is 
one of the underlying reasons for Germany’s ever 
expanding external surplus.  
Source: Statistisches Bundesamt 
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Source: World Bank 
On the aggregate level, Germany mainly exports 
finished capital goods which are highly attractive 
to economies in their growth phase (Figure 3). 
Furthermore, approximately one third of 
Germany’s exports are intermediate goods 
contributing to the operation of transnational 
supply chains and regional production networks in 
Asia and Eastern Europe. Therefore semi-finished 
German goods are also fervently sought after 
(German Council of Economic Experts 2014; 
Schuknecht 2014). Sector-wise, Germany’s high-
end sector, which generated a total value of €55 
billion and its luxury goods worth more than €32 
billion in 2012 (MEISTERKREIS-Branchenmonitor 
2013), is the spearhead of Germany’s booming 
exports. Thanks to their world-renowned 
craftsmanship, coupled with “a constant stream of 
technical innovations and modern, timeless 
design”, German products are world leading, with 
limited substitutes of matching quality and appeal 
in various industries such as motor vehicles (and 
other transport equipment) and super yachts 
(MEISTERKREIS-Branchenmonitor 2013). In the 
luxury car industry, for example, three German 
brands, Mercedes, BMW6 and Volkswagen’s Audi 
collectively enjoying 70% market share, whereas 
the Japanese brands have just 10% (Economist 
2014a). Another pillar of Germany's industrial 
potency is the capital goods manufacturing sector 
which is heavily dominated by the Mittelstand (the 
“Middle Class”) enterprises, notably the companies 
that design and assemble sophisticated machine 
tools that developing economies need as they seek 
to develop indigenous manufacturing capabilities 
and climb up the value chain (Rattner 2011). 
Between 1999 and 2011, the volume of high-tech 
German exports escalated from $77.2 billion to 
$183.4 billion and the share of exports with 
advanced technologies (16.4% on average) 
remained stable and high compared to other major 
exporting economies (Figure 4). Between 2000 and 
2011, the volume of German export increased by 
70% while the value index soared upwards by 
more than 167% (Figure 5).      
                                                        
6 BMW made unprecedented sales in 2013 and the record 
was again lifted by 7.2% in 2014, reaching over 120,000 
vehicles worldwide (BMW 2015). 
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If “Made in China” is a guarantee of low price, 
“Made in Germany” is a warranty of high quality. 
On that account, Germany’s surpluses are 
accumulated not only through exporting goods of 
ever greater quantity, but also through selling 
goods of ever higher quality. Given the fact that 
the most avid importers of German goods are 
among the emerging and less developed 
economies – for example, the share of German 
exports to China rose from 1% in 1999 to 6% in 
2013 (German Council of Economic Experts 2014) – 
the current account surplus also reflects the “new 
normal” of international economic development 
whereby the development of lower-income 
economies outpaced that of developed economies.  
3.2 Domestic wage restraints 
The “enviable global edge” (Rattner 2011) German 
exporters possess is also underpinned by a 
favourable domestic cost structure which is 
characterised by wage increment lagging behind 
productivity improvement.  
Due to the soaring wage across the spectrum of 
German economy after the reunification, labour 
union leaders in the late 1990s agreed to supress 
the wage increase rate below the growth of 
productivity (Flassbeck 2007; Ma and McCauley 
2013). This largely voluntary wage restraint was 
complimented  by a series of government-led 
labour market reforms, the so-called Schröder 
Agenda 2010, that attempted to cut down the then 
rocketing unemployment rate (Economist 2013a). 
The Hartz reforms, the core of the reform package, 
revolutionised the low end job market and 
curtailed state-sponsored jobless benefits 
substantially. It got rid of payroll taxes on earnings 
of less than €400 a month, giving rise to the 
creation of part-time, mini-jobs with miserable 
wages (Economist 2013a; Krebs and Scheffel 2013). 
The knock-on effects of the reform forced labour 
union to accept years of tight wage constraint in 
return for job security and economic prosperity. As 
of 2008, the wage share in Germany’s national 
income had been cut to a half-century low of 
64.5%. The number of full-time workers on low 
Source: OECD, author’s calculations.  
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wages7 - often defined as less than two thirds of 
middle income - rose by 13.5% to 4.3 million 
between 2005 and 2010 (Marsh and Hansen 2012). 
Since the conversion to the euro, German workers’ 
wages have been augmented by merely 0.62% per 
annum on average in nominal terms, leaving them 
virtually unchanged in real terms. Unsurprisingly, 
German unit labour costs (ULCs) fell sharply vis-à-
vis those in other eurozone countries. This lengthy 
wage moderation even departed from Germany’s 
pre-Maastricht norm of 2% annual increase in 
labour wages (Figure 6).  
Wage restraint is especially evident in Germany’s 
internationally exposed manufacturing sector, in 
part because of the threat of off-shoring 
production networks to neighbouring lower cost 
countries from multinational corporations 
(Dustmann, Fitzenberger, Schoenberg, and Spitz-
Oener 2014). Although German manufacturers 
have been creating more value than the whole 
economy, the ULC index fell below that of the 
                                                        
7  From 2015 onwards, Germany adopts a compulsory, 
statutory wage floor of €8.50 ($11.61) an hour. This is the 
country's first national minimum wage approved by the 
German Parliament. Its effect on Germany’s current account 
surplus remains to be seen.  
whole economy with the notable exception being 
the economic turmoil years in 2008-09 (Figures 7 & 
8). Low wages in Germany further strengthened 
the competitiveness of Germany’s manufactured 
exports but at the same time weakened the 
Germans’ financial capacity to consume imported 
foreign goods. As such, the diverging effect is an 
important contributing driver of the trade surplus.     
3.3 Undervalued euro for Germany 
In theory, balance of payment disequilibria can be 
corrected by movement in exchange rate. The 
currency of a trade surplus economy will 
appreciate since the demand for its currency will 
outstrip the supply of it, thus eroding the 
competitiveness of its exports in international 
markets. Conversely, the currency of a deficit 
economy is set to depreciate and drives down the 
prices of its exports. Either way is envisioned to 
neutralise the imbalances between exports and 
imports. Therefore, before sharing a common 
currency with Germany, European economies 
running sizable trade deficits routinely devalued 
their currencies against the Deutsche Mark to 
boost their economic competitiveness and restore 
trade balance (Tilford 2010).   
Source: OECD  Source: OECD  
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Such automatic adjustment mechanism, however, 
is gone as Germany gave up its Deutsche Mark and 
adopted the euro in 1999.  Germany, along with 
the other EU economies joining the euro area, had 
surrendered their monetary autonomy to the 
independent, supranational European Central Bank 
(ECB) located in Frankfurt. Ever since, the value of 
the currency German exporters use to price their 
goods and services in international markets is 
determined by the homogenised market 
fundamentals in the eurozone as a whole, rather 
than the economic dynamics within its sovereign 
geographic boundaries.   
The Eurozone's overall feeble economic 
performance and the implosive sovereign debt 
crises  have kept the exchange rate of the euro far 
below what the Deutsche Mark would be worth 
today if it still existed (Rattner 2011). Germany’s 
consumer price index-adjusted real exchange rate 
crawlingly depreciates after the inception of the 
euro in spite of a general upward trend of the euro 
value (Figure 9)8. It is estimated that if Germany 
abandoned the euro, its national currency would 
immediately appreciate by more than one third  
(Rattner 2011).  
On 22 January 2015, the ECB finally overcame its 
once resolute resistance to unconventional 
monetary policies – more specifically the 
quantitative easing (QE) scheme championed by 
the US Federal Reserve and the Bank of Japan – to 
launch an aggressive €60 billion per month bond-
buying programme with the goal of injecting a 
minimum of €1.1 trillion into the chronically frail 
economy in the euro area. The announcement 
made by Mario Draghi, President of the ECB, sent 
the euro to an 11-year low against the US dollar 
and the euro has hitherto lost 6% of its value in 
20159 (BBC 2015).  
                                                        
8  Reach exchange rates are the relative costs or prices 
expressed in a common currency, taking into account of 
inflation, that measure the international competitiveness of 
goods and services produced in a country (Stutely 2010b).  
9 At the time of writing (27 January 2015), EUR 1 = USD 
1.1244. The exchange rate hit record low of EUR 1 = USD 
1.1198 on 23 January 2015, the day after Mario Draghi’s 
announcement.   
Source: Bank of International Settlement 
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This unwittingly undervalued trading currency 
grants Germany a tremendous advantage over 
other economies with their own, most likely more 
expensive currencies, by making already cherished 
German goods artificially cheap in international 
markets. The latest episode of euro debasement 
will simply redirect Europe’s internal imbalances 
outwards instead of scaling down Germany’s 
external surplus as the loose monetary policy only 
acts to push Germany’s competitiveness even 
further.    
3.4 High domestic savings rate 
The current account equates to the country’s net 
lending to foreigners. Savings and investment in 
Germany are not correlated, contrary to what 
orthodox macroeconomic theory would have 
predicted – gross savings as a share of GDP is 
exceptionally high in Germany by advanced 
economy standard (Figure 10) while gross capital 
formation rate has been declining steadily, falling 
from 24% in 1989 to 19% in 2013 (Figure 10). This 
widening saving-investment gap is also at the heart 
of Germany’s large-scale current account surplus. 
It is worrying to critics that the figure is likely to be 
beefed up further if the past trend can be 
extrapolated.  
On the side of the saving glut, research suggests 
that there is a high saving (and concomitantly low 
investment) propensity among German 
households (Kollmann, Ratto, Roeger, Veld, and 
Vogel 2014). This lead The Economist (2014b) 
magazine to cry out that “German savers are a 
strange lot; they shun stocks, bonds and houses, 
instead parking over €2 trillion in ordinary savings 
accounts.” Three structural factors – ageing 
demographic trend, cultural hostility to 
presumably speculative investment and low 
homeownership – provide credible elucidations to 
the eccentric German households saving 
behaviours.  
To begin with, the high savings rate reflects 
German households’ concerns about a rapidly 
ageing population (Huefner and Koske 2010; IMF 
2014; Kollmann et al. 2014). The average life 
expectancy of Germans has been lifted from 75 in 
1990 by 6 years to 81 in 2012 while the total 
fertility rate in Germany (1.4 births per woman) 
has been below the natural “replacement level” 
(roughly 2.1 births per woman) 10  for decades. 
Hence it is projected that the German working 
population will shrink from 44.7 million (55% of 
total population) in 2011 to 35.4 million (48%) 
whereas the elder cohorts who are unlikely to 
support themselves through economic activities 
will increase from 17.2 million (21%) to 23.6 
million (32%) by 2040-41 (Wong 2013). The 
foreseeable higher labour force dependency 
ratio 11  entails lower future per-capita pension 
entitlements in a “Pay-As-You-Go” 12  pension 
                                                        
10 A level required to at least sustain the current population 
size (Ji 2014).  
11 The dependency ratio is an age-population ratio of those 
typically not in the labour force and those in.  
12 A retirement scheme where the plan beneficiaries decide 
how much they want to contribute either by having the 
Source: World Bank 
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system, understandably providing an incentive to 
increase household savings (IMF 2014; Kollmann et 
al. 2014).     
Secondly, Germany is a risk-averse, frugal society, 
prizing the virtues of saving and generally 
denouncing investments as speculative, gambling 
activities. In a 2011 poll conducted for the Federal 
Association of German Banks, less than 10% 
Germans surveyed mentioned “building wealth”, 
60% of respondents said “security”, and as low as 
15% vocally prioritised “returns”, when asked 
about the most crucial criterion for an investment 
(Economist 2013b). The survey results are in 
conformity with the generalised public perception 
that “banks are simply flogging high-commission 
products” and trading in stock and property 
markets is a form of shameful, opportunistic 
gambling (Economist 2013b, 2014b).   
Germans' firmly embedded economic caution has 
roots in the catastrophic war eras and the 
hyperinflation in the Weimar Republic of the 1920s 
(Stevens 2011). Nowadays Germans take ever 
more pride in their thrifty philosophy of not to live 
beyond their means. Younger generations are 
frequently indoctrinated by their parents to buy 
what they can afford and pay with the money they 
have. That attitude is so far-reaching that makes 
Germany a sag market for credit card companies as 
the word ‘credit’ is perceived to be negative in 
German culture (Stevens 2011). According to the 
Euromonitor International, a market intelligence 
firm, a typical American makes transactions worth 
$4,236 in credit card a year, in stark contrast with 
the German figure of $158 a year (Foxbusiness 
2011). A side effect of the credit card phobia is 
that debit cards, online bank transfers and PayPal 
are far more common in Germany than credit 
cards, implying what most Germans want is “a 
                                                                                                
specified amount regularly deducted from their pay check or 
by contributing the desired amount in a lump sum. 
payment tool, not a credit tool”(Foxbusiness 2011; 
Stevens 2011). 
Another cultural factor that leads to high savings 
rate and debilitated domestic investment in 
Germany is the low homeownership (Table 1). On 
the flip side, a higher propensity of owning a 
property will in all likelihood deplete savings and 
boost household investment (Figure 11). 
Germany’s homeownership rate (52.6% in 2013) 
ranks among the lowest in the developed world 
(Stevens 2015). Germany’s rental-dominated real 
estate market goes all the way back to the grievous 
experiences of the post-World War II era when the 
vast majority of new housing units in the war-torn 
Germany were rentals without incurring ownership. 
Nowadays, Germany’s renter-friendly housing 
policy, cheap rental (Phillips 2014) and the absence 
of tax relief on debt financing cost of 
homeownership (Kirkegaard 2014) collectively dis-
incentivise  Germans to buy and own houses. 
There is no such culture as “my home is my castle” 
in Germany. It is reasonably probable that this 
trend will endure as 93% Germans declared 
satisfaction with the current housing situation 
according to the OECD Better Life Index 2013 
(Phillips 2014).  The upward shift in the age 
Source: Table 1, World Bank 
 
EUC Working Paper No. 24 
 
12 
 
structure of the German demographics and a 
downward slip towards a smaller household size 
will continue to dampen the already anaemic 
demand for homeownership in Germany. Germans 
thus save the funds that would have been used to 
purchase property.  
 
High savings rate is not the sole culprit - weak 
domestic investment is also to blame. Public 
investment undertaken by various levels of 
German governments fell from 6% of GDP in 1970 
to the current level of 2% (Economist 2015). 
Underinvestment in infrastructure is ubiquitous – 
40% of bridges in Germany are in “critical 
condition” and capital stock of German 
machineries stay flat in real terms since 2008 
(Economist 2015). At the same time, German non-
financial corporates (NFCs), instead of offsetting 
slender government and household investment, 
are reluctant to invest as well. Although the 
structure of labour market in Germany shifts the 
distribution away from wages and towards 
corporate profits (Ma and McCauley 2013), 
German NFCs are more inclined to park their 
revenue overseas in part to finance foreign 
affiliates (IMF 2014). Investors also cite their 
concern over the “uncertainty and nervousness 
over the future” of the euro, economic downturn 
and lukewarm business climate in Europe, as well 
as anxieties over discouraging German government 
policies such as the simultaneous exit from fossil 
fuels and nuclear energy, dubbed the “energy 
transition”, that render new investment less 
profitable in light of hiking utility bills (Economist 
2015) 13  to back their overseas investment 
decisions.      
In sum, all these factors aforementioned – a rising 
share of the population that is entering a life phase 
which is characterised by a higher tendency to 
save, risk-aversion attitudes and cultural suspicion 
towards investment, frugal lifestyle, low 
homeownership, domestic wage moderation, 
investment decline – are behind the progressively 
expanding saving-investment gap that eventuate in 
the current account surplus Germany finds itself in.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
13 Other reasons include the emerging global trend that 
corporates tend to hold extra cash either to hedge against 
sudden interruption of cash flow (Bates, Kahle, and Stulz 
2009) or to fund research and development activities that 
are difficult to obtain external financing (IMF 2014) after the 
financial crises.  In this regard, German companies are of no 
exception. 
Table 1. Aggregate homeownership rates in selected OECD countries
Circa 1990s¹ 2004² 2012²
Australia 71.4 69.5 67.0
Austria 46.3 51.6 57.5
Belgium 67.7 71.7³ 72.3
Canada 61.3 68.9 69.0
Denmark 51.0 51.6 64.3
Finland 65.4 66.0 73.9
France 55.3 54.8³ 63.7
Germany 36.3 41.0 53.3
Greece 83.1 73.2 75.9
Ireland 79.6 81.4³ 69.6
Italy 64.2 67.9 74.1
Luxembourg 71.6 69.3 70.8
Mexico 77.2 70.7 80.0
Netherlands 47.5 55.4³ 67.5
Spain 77.8 83.2 78.9
Switzerland 33.1 38.4 43.8
United Kingdom 67.5 70.7 66.7
United States 66.2 68.7 65.2
1. 1987 for Austria, 1990 for Spain, 1991 for Italy, 1992 for Denmark and
Switzerland, 1994 for Canada, France, Germany, Mexico and the Netherlands,
1995 for Australia, Belgium, Finland, Greece and Ireland, 1997 for Luxembourg
and United States.
2. 2003 and 2011 for Australia, 2007 for Germany, 2007 and 2013 for United
States, 2011 for Canada, 2009 for Mexico, 
3. The data is particularly dated for Belgium (2000), France (2000), Ireland 
(2000) and the Netherlands (1999).
Sources:  OECD, Luxembourg Income Study (LIS), GSOEP and the American 
Housing Survey, Statista, US Census Bureau, Eurostat,  Statistics Canada, 
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3.5 Interest rate convergence in the eurozone 
The adoption of the euro permitted the 
deployment of the excessive German savings 
within the euro area without exchange rate risk 
(Ma and McCauley 2013). German banks and other 
institutional investors faced a drastically different 
investment environment prior to the euro as they 
were unable to take long foreign exchange 
positions. German economy as a whole also had 
trouble in recycling surplus that was in excess of 
4% of GDP – ultimately it was up to a periodically 
revaluated Deutsche Mark to pare down the 
surplus (Gros and Mayer 2012). Failing to ascertain 
profitable investment opportunities in homeland, 
German capital fled abroad to the US, Central and 
Eastern Europe and eurozone’s peripheral 
economies. German economy is one of the 
healthiest in the world notwithstanding, 
“[e]verywhere else gold appeared to shine more 
brightly than in Germany,” and  “[e]ven small 
interest rate differences prompted investors to 
invest abroad the new capital provided by German 
savers”(Sinn 2011). Between 2002 and 2010, a 
total of €1.05 trillion14 German savings had been 
                                                        
14 €356 billion were exported by Bundesbank under the 
framework of TARGET through Eurosystem. Other financial 
intermediated to finance foreign consumption and 
investment, dwarfing the amount invested 
domestically (€554 billion) (Sinn 2011). The steady 
efflux of German savings makes Germany’s 
international balance sheet one of the largest in 
the world.  In October 1999, Germany’s 
international investment position – an 
approximate cumulative sum of the current 
account – was €63.7 billion and this figure shot up 
to €1.42 trillion, or 39.2% of GDP, by July 2014 
(Figure 12).  
With the accession of GIIPS (Greece, Ireland, Italy, 
Portugal and Spain) into the monetary union, their 
nominal interest rates, or the cost of borrowing, 
rapidly gravitated towards the German rate (Figure 
13). Moral hazard was pervasive – financial 
markets performed poor due diligence and 
practically treated public bonds and private 
liabilities issued by GIIPS economies in the same 
way as if they were issued by Germany.  
Over the last decades, higher inflation rates in the 
southern deficit countries than in the northern 
surplus countries have been noted (Steinherr 2013) 
as a result of the income convergence in the euro 
area. Lower German inflation dictated that the 
German real interest rate was higher than that of 
the rest of eurozone economies, exacerbating the 
capital flight and the resultant current account 
surplus. In contrast, high inflation rate in the South 
drove their real interest rate into negative territory. 
Governments that used to be charged high risk 
premium found themselves immersed in capital 
floods and a “credit bonanza” but, unfortunately, 
they abused their favourable debtor positions – 
which was underpinned by the competitiveness of 
the German economy rather than that of their own 
– and created an unsustainable credit-financed 
boom. Private individuals used the cheap credit to 
buy property, low-skilled workers got well-paid 
                                                                                                
exports amounted to €470 billion and net foreign direct 
investment was €227 billion.   
Source: Deutsche Bundesbank 
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leading to a wave of immigration (Sinn 2011). 
Imprudent governments exploited the ease of 
financing  to raise the salaries of overblown public 
sector employees (Sinn 2011) and fund projects 
that make no economic sense. For example, Greek 
government borrowed excessively to build roads 
to nowhere, upgrade its urban transport 
infrastructure and build extravagant sports 
facilities, which were invariably deserted shortly 
afterwards, in the leading up to the 2004 Athens 
Summer Olympic Games.   
To sum up, Germany’s current account surplus and 
eurozone peripheries’ deficit are two sides of the 
same coin. The launch of the euro facilitated the 
mobilisation of excessive German savings into 
other eurozone countries in a foreign exchange 
risk-free manner; the nominal interest rate 
convergence accelerated the capital outflow and 
contributed to Germany’s swelling current account 
surplus. On the flip side, GIIPS misappropriated 
their well-disposed eurozone privileges and 
responded to the lowered borrowing cost by 
uplifting their consumption and investment, 
resulting in massive unsustainable current account 
deficits.  
4. Spill-over effect and ideational disputes over 
Germany’s surplus 
There is little doubt over the existence and the 
astonishing size of Germany’s current account 
surplus. There are, however, fundamentally 
diverging views in Europe regarding the nature of 
the surplus, its spill-over effect on the European 
economic recovery and the appropriate policy 
prescriptions to correct it.  
4.1 Spill over effect of Germany’s surplus 
The US Treasury (2013) accused Germany of 
devastating their European compatriots by 
creating “a deflationary bias for the euro area”. 
Basically there are three pathways through which 
Germany’s strong external positions exert 
“deflationary” pressures on the eurozone as a 
whole, dimming the recovery prospect of the euro 
peripheries in particular and that of the EU in 
general. 
Source: European Central Bank Statistical Data Warehouse, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis  
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The first is by pushing up the value of the euro 
through creating a current account surplus in the 
euro area (Springford and Tilford 2014).  Before 
the euro crisis, the current account surplus in 
Germany was largely countervailed by the deficits 
in the south (partly because the deficits in the 
south was financed by German savings in the first 
place as detailed above), making the overall 
current account in eurozone just about balanced 
(Figure 14). However, with the narrowing of 
deficits in GIIPS,15 the current account balance of 
eurozone had been driven up, primarily by German 
                                                        
15 Greece reduced deficit from -7.4% to 0.5% of national GDP 
between 2005 and 2013. Over the same period, Italy 
balanced its current account from -1.6% to 1.0%, Ireland 
from -3.4% to 6.2%, Portugal from -10.0% to 0.5%, and Spain 
from -7.2% to 0.8%.  
surplus, to a respectable  +2.4% of GDP in 2013.16 
An economy that has a surplus will experience 
upward pressure on the value of its currency. But a 
stronger euro waters down the competitiveness of 
all European exports, deters foreign demand and 
lowers the prices of imported goods and services. 
The compositional disparities in the export profiles 
of Germany and those of the southern peripheries 
have made the apportionment of the currency 
appreciation burden skewed in favour of the 
former – the demand for Germany’s quality capital 
goods is relatively rigid and non-price factors tend 
to stabilise the demand fluctuations in the face of 
an appreciated euro, while a sizable share of 
                                                        
16 As such, it may be inappropriate to call the European debt 
crisis as Europe as a whole did not have significant external 
debt problem, but an internal imbalance.  
Source: OECD, European Central Bank Statistical Data Warehouse  
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exports17 from southern eurozone member states 
are more price sensitive. As a consequence, their 
exporters are disproportionately hurt vis-à-vis 
German counterparts by the strengthened euro. 
All these reinforce the deflationary trend in the 
eurozone since investors roll back on investing, 
leading companies to cut back on production, 
which in turn leads to lower output and lower 
income. 
Secondly, Germany’s surplus may hinder the 
eurozone recovery through exporting its ailing 
inflation, thereby pulling its neighbours down. A 
low inflation in Germany implies weak domestic 
demand for European goods and services, leaving 
those troubled economies reliant on external 
                                                        
17 Such as the animal products in Ireland and the luxurious 
fashion products of Italy. Worse, according to the former 
Venezuela Minister of Planning Hausmann (2015), Greece 
produces very little of what the world wants to consume. It 
mainly exports fruits, olive oil, raw cotton, tobacco, and 
some refined petroleum products. Greek industry produces 
no machines, electronics, or chemicals. Of every $10 of world 
trade in information technology, Greece accounts for $0.01. 
demand to stimulate growth. European crisis 
economies have to, on the one hand, cope with a 
rising euro that renders their products less 
attractive in international markets and, on the 
other hand, work very hard to open up and exploit 
new extra-regional markets. Even in those markets 
afield, their efforts are undercut by keen German 
exporters who display superior price and quality 
differentials. The inveterately low wage in 
Germany makes regaining competitiveness for the 
southern peripheries a distant hope – GIIPS 
exporters have to cut wages significantly to a level 
that is below the already low German wage 
benchmark (Figure 6). This is why German 
manufacturers win business contracts and German 
workers take away jobs. Empirical data suggest 
that Germany’s surplus drives down German 
unemployment rate but is positively correlated 
with the jobless rates in the GIIPS (Figure15) – for 
the latter, it does not make much difference 
whether Germany is doing this maliciously or with 
the best of intentions, it is just doing it all the same 
(Krugman 2013b). But the wage cut is a double-
Source: OECD 
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edged sword as it also can throw the economy into 
death spirals by making debts harder to pay back 
(O'Brien 2013). 
In a similar vein, Germany projects its ultra-tight 
macroeconomic discipline and self-inflicted 
austerity on other eurozone crisis members. In 
fairness, monetary and fiscal discipline is certainly 
a virtue in good times while it could well be a curse 
during economic crisis and hardship. Germany 
voluntarily pursues strict fiscal austerity despite its 
net creditor position. It insistently refrains from 
providing Keynesian–style stimulus to bolster 
domestic consumption and investment when it can 
borrow at literally zero cost. In doing so, Germany 
contributes to the credit squeeze in Europe and 
imposes its contractionary policies on crisis 
economies that are in desperate need of more 
accommodating policies. The continent-wide 
austerity impacted negatively the demand for each 
other’s exports – even German exports would have 
been up by 6% had there been no widespread 
adoption of austerity measures (Figure 16) – and 
thus stifled growth. On the aggregate level, it is 
estimated that 20% of Germany’s cost of austerity 
measures and fiscal consolidation spills over onto 
its neighbours and Greek and Spanish GDP were 
18% and 9.7% lower than they would have been, 
respectively (O'Brien 2013; Veld 2013). It further 
demonstrates that the deficit adjustment in the 
south is predominantly realised by depressed 
economic activities rather than recouped 
competitiveness (Krugman 2013a). By historical 
analogy, it seems that Berlin is repeating the 
mistakes of the IMF in mishandling the 1997-98 
Asian financial crisis – the IMF prescribed austerity 
when expansionary policy instruments would have 
helped the affected countries’ spent their way out 
of recession.   
4.2 Disputes over the surplus and politics of blame 
A persistently large German current account 
surplus is making the European economy suffer 
and it is clear that something has gone dreadfully 
wrong.18 Why is Germany – a country in most 
cases acts as a responsible power in the 
community – so reluctant to tackle the seemingly 
palpable economic disequilibrium? Why is the 
adjustment process in the eurozone taking place at 
a glacial speed? I would argue that this impasse is 
due to the a parlous perceptual gap that is opening 
up between Germany and the “sinking rest” over 
the nature of the surplus and the contentious 
disputes over the roles surplus and deficit 
economies are obliged to play respectively in the 
painful adjustment process. After all, an effective 
rebalancing demands governments in both 
creditor and debtor countries to deflect the 
trajectory of their existing macroeconomic policies, 
aligning the national policy objectives with the 
economic conditions abroad. Citizens from the two 
camps also need to be persuaded to deviate from 
their familiar way of life that they have been 
accustomed to in the past decade.    
From the German perspective, criticism on its 
strong external position is “incomprehensible”, as 
                                                        
18 Comments from an EU diplomat during the workshop 
requesting anonymity.   
Source: O’Brien (2013) 
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the German finance ministry spokesman has put it, 
hence “[t]here are no imbalances in Germany 
which require a correction of our growth-friendly 
economic and fiscal policy”. It is utterly justifiable 
for the Germans to feel a strong notion of injustice 
since in their eyes Germany’s huge current account 
surplus is hard-won thanks to a combination of 
self-sacrificing mentality, industrious work ethics, 
sophisticated quality capital goods and prudent life 
philosophy, thus reflecting the competitiveness of 
their economy, the resilience of their national 
character and the overall strength of their country 
at large. The euro peripheries are teetering along 
the brink of disaster precisely because they do not 
master the qualities Germans do and the southern 
Europeans, the “leeches, selfish and corrupt” 
Greek 19  (Schofield 2015) in particular, are so 
appeased to work little, retire early and enjoy a 
cup of coffee that is financed by tireless German 
taxpayers. Meanwhile, it is equally understandable 
that the German government is furious at the irony 
that the disapproval came from an infamously 
macro-imprudent country, the US, which itself has 
run current account deficits for more than three 
decades. Policymakers alike in Berlin pronounce 
that Germany has no reason to apologise for its 
surplus as stacking foreign reserves in the 
Bundesbank’s vault is the result of free market 
process and not of a consciously distorted public 
policy (Pisani-Ferry 2013; Kirkegaard 2014).  
In conformity with this belief, Germany argues that 
the critics are barking up the wrong tree 
concerning the surplus rebalancing – an artificially 
weakened German economy, Europe’s sole growth 
engine, serves no one’s interest and only  acts to 
deepen the recession. It seems to be insane for 
                                                        
19 According to Hanska (2013), during the first act of the 
sovereign debt crisis in 2010, the German news magazine 
Focus titled that the Greeks were “Cheats in the Euro 
Family.” The Bild Zeitung reproduced the discourse of Greeks 
as “dishonest and feckless” people, by coining the neologism 
‘Pleite-Griechen’ (bankrupt Greeks).  
Germany to persuade global customers to cease 
from purchasing preferred German products or to 
price their exports in a separate currency 
altogether. The often-touted prescription that 
Germany should raise domestic demand is naïve 
and ill-conceived as well. Ludger Schuknecht 
(2014), Director General at the German Ministry of 
Finance, contends that the GDP gap has been 
closed and any artificial demand stimuli will be 
pro-cyclical, representing a waste of public money. 
Indeed, even if Germany wants to boost domestic 
demand through Keynesian style fiscal policy 
instrument and public investment, the  
constitutional “debt brake”, adopted in 2009, 
which in principle requires federal government to 
fund new projects with new revenue stream, is the 
obstacle that could prove insuperable in the 
absence of strong political will or knock-down 
economic argument.  
Dominant public opinion circulated in German 
academia, media and political rhetoric holds that it 
is entirely up to the euro peripheries, whose fiscal 
profligacy, structural deficiencies and economic 
weaknesses in other forms triggered the crisis in 
the first place, to clear up the mess, tighten their 
belt and restore economic competitiveness (Weeks 
2011; Schofield 2015). The eurozone peripheries’ 
economic and political troubles have also 
produced a diminishing appetite for Germany’s 
long run economic engagement and venture in the 
monetary union. Accordingly, Germany insists that 
courageous and swift structural reforms, including 
public expenditure cut and tax escalation, must be 
performed – the bolder and the quicker the 
reforms are undertaking, the shorter time it will 
take for them to bounce back. In essence, 
Chancellor Angela Merkel wants to minimise the 
negative externalities of the rebalancing inflict on 
German exporters and taxpayers (Privitera 2014) 
as domestic resentment may spiral out of control 
should conscientious German workers that have 
been earning low wages are robbed of the fruits of 
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their labour because of the debt in southern 
Europe or EU administered bailout schemes 
(Ntampoudi 2014).  
Germany is also afraid that an easier way out for 
the struggling economies may dis-incentivise them 
from implementing painstaking yet imperative 
structural reforms that are tasked to eradicate the 
underlying inefficiencies and fundamental 
imbalances in their respective economic systems. 
Germany’s fear is not completely unsubstantiated 
– in the case of Greece, after unprecedented sum 
of highly subsidised finance to help it to reduce its 
excessive spending, still Athens insisted some of its  
debt must be forgiven to make room for more 
spending (Hausmann 2015). Germany generally 
takes the view that GIIPS have to take the bitter 
pill if they are to recover.  
However, the eurozone’s southern tier, the US 
Treasury and a handful of prominent US trained 
economists approach the same issue from a 
markedly different angle. The narrative they 
uphold is that GIIPS are the victims of Germany’s 
political scapegoating strategy (Hanska 2013) – 
blaming others to distract from Berlin’s own failure 
and incompetence. The illusionary economic 
strength of Germany manifested in the volume of 
current account surplus actually calls into question 
the blind spot and policy errors of Berlin, in the 
same way as the episodes of the euro crisis bring 
GIIPS’s economic dysfunction into the open. The 
borrowers maintain that they have done their 
homework to balance their accounts (see Figure 14) 
and it is Germany’s turn to deliver on its side of the 
bargain (Krugman 2013b). The deficit economies 
cite Keynes, arguing that the only way through 
which a lasting trade imbalance can be corrected is 
a symmetric adjustment in which debtors’ efforts 
in reducing deficits is matched by creditors’ 
surplus-contracting endeavours. German 
miscomprehension and misinterpretation of the 
appeal from southern Europe originates in their 
confusion between trade surplus and strong 
exports (Privitera 2014), which do not necessarily 
go hand in hand. Germany could simply import and 
invest more to balance its current account and 
stimulate European economies without 
decelerating or jeopardising its flourishing exports 
given the estimation that every one percentage 
increase in Germany’s spending will reduce 
German current account surplus by 0.3% to 0.4% 
and translate into a minimum GDP gain of 0.2% for 
southern Europe (Veld 2013). 
Germany’s rigid position has fostered a wave of 
political backlash as the debate over EU’s internal 
imbalance is increasingly politicised – governments 
in deficit economies point their fingers to 
Germany’s alleged political cowardliness and 
economic irrationality in the midst of a prolonged 
political and economic malaise. The euro 
peripheries are especially upset by the fact that 
despite Germany’s unique economic capacity and 
political clout to bring the crisis to an end, Berlin 
obstinately refuses to accept the obligations that 
are associated with its leadership role in the 
eurozone. When times were good, Germany free-
rode on the single currency that allowed German 
exporters to price goods in a less expensive 
currency and spattered cash on the peripheries, 
and now it shrugs and acts as if it has never yearn 
for the much-enjoyed dominant position while 
continuing to profit from the crisis of others  
(Economist 2011; Krugman 2013b). Germany 
routinely lectures southern Europe to export their 
way out of the crisis and back to prosperity, but 
eschew products from southern Europe, depriving 
challenged economies of urgently needed export 
income and so preventing them from balancing 
their deficits. On that account the rebalancing 
adjustment in the distressed southern Europe is 
achieved through buying less rather than selling 
more at the expense of the rest of the world as 
detailed above. Without growth, closing deficits 
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through austerity is akin to climbing a falling ladder 
(Economist 2011). 
A game of blaming has been staged in the euro 
area. Under the alleged ‘insular’, ‘short-sighted’ 
and ‘egotistical’ leadership tainted by national 
stereotyping and prejudice (Augstein 2013; 
Ntampoudi 2014), what Berlin has done amounts 
to little more than political pandering, passing the 
buck and moralising about GIIPS’s past 
wrongdoings. In response, the southern 
peripheries counter that while it is incontestable 
that their failure of conforming to the 
macroeconomic prudence a common currency 
demanded precipitated the euro crisis, it is 
Germany (and France) that violated the economic 
convergence criteria laid out in the 1992 
Maastricht Treaty in 2003, ahead of others, by 
running a budget deficit to GDP ratio exceeding 
the legally binding 3% ceiling. The Franco-German 
leadership core got away with the malpractice and 
no serious punitive, disciplinary actions were taken 
at the EU level. Germany’s negative demonstration 
effect sowed the seeds of the eurozone debt crisis 
and internal imbalances, enervating Germany’s 
righteousness and legitimacy in berating southern 
Europe’s disrespect for and violations of EU 
regulations.  
Admittedly, Germany is confronted with a 
“paradox of thrift” whereby saving and frugality 
that are beneficial to Germany turns out to be 
deleterious to the economic community – a penny 
“saved” by Germany, however, may not be a 
penny “earned” for the whole union. A swelling 
trade surplus during times of economic stagnation 
contributes to the shortage of aggregate demand 
and decreases continental wealth to the detriment 
of all. To southern Europe and the EU, Germany 
should surmount this moralistic dilemma and its 
paranoid dedication to “export fetish”, being 
reassured that a controlled increase in domestic 
consumption, investment and inflation is not a 
slippery slope to the dark days of the Weimar 
Republic. Germany should opt for a growth-
oriented imbalance remedy approach instead of an 
austerity-oriented one, as along the latter route 
the eurozone will descend to irreversible 
stagnations. Economic duress may eventually turn 
out to be a “beggar-thyself”, “murder-suicide pact” 
(Stiglitz 2002; O'Brien 2013).  
To some, such as the former Italian Prime Minister 
Silvio Berlusconi and George Soros, when it is the 
gatekeeper rather than the troublemakers that 
drags the European economy down, maybe “it’s 
time to kick Germany out of the eurozone” 
(Jahncke 2012; Soros 2013; Chovanec 2015).      
5. Concluding remarks 
This paper identifies five major drivers behind the 
expanding current account surplus in Germany. 
The piling-up of surplus over the last decades does 
not lend itself to a single-factor explanation as 
intertwining international and domestic factors are 
jointly at play. Strong global demand for quality 
German exports, domestic wage restraint, an 
undervalued single currency, high domestic savings 
rate and interest rate convergence towards 
German rate in the eurozone that drains domestic 
investment are singled out as the main 
contributing factors. It is concluded that 
mercantilism with German characteristics is 
essentially a state of mind that goes beyond a host 
of trade barriers or protectionist policies 
(Prestowitz 2012). 
Without question, the solid external position of 
Germany constitutes both a testimony showcasing 
praiseworthy economic competitiveness and 
vigour in Germany and, unfortunately at the same 
time, a creeping threat to other eurozone member 
states, making their deficit adjustment process and 
economic recovery a harder mission to accomplish. 
This makes Germany’s current gigantic account 
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surplus a legitimate concern for the EU as a whole 
(Privitera 2014).    
Although the phenomenon of Germany’s 
macroeconomic imbalance is widely recognised 
and could even be readily explained by 
Macroeconomics 101, in the words of Noble Prize 
laureate Paul Krugman (2013a), there is much less 
consensus regarding the nature of the surplus and  
what sort of corrective measures should be taken, 
adding to the distributional conflicts over who 
should bear the rebalancing cost. This worsening 
divide between the core and the periphery 
Eurozone economies and the accompanying 
undiplomatic exchange is a game of chicken 
(Krugman 2015) in which two drivers drive towards 
each other on a collision course: each expects to 
survive on the other’s willingness to compromise 
and sacrifice.  
For an economy with external surplus of 
Germany’s size, the question is a matter of “use it, 
or lose it” (Kirkegaard 2014) and for deficit 
economies in a monetary union in desperate need 
of restoring order and legitimacy, the question is 
really a matter of “stay or leave”. The eurozone 
core-periphery animosity is exerting its economic 
as well as political toll on the European integration 
project. Abandoning the politics of blaming and 
rebalancing the disequilibrium obviously convey 
mutual benefits – stabilising the stagnating 
eurozone economy is of utmost urgency, not 
teaching GIIPS a lesson or accusing Germany for 
creating a two-speed Europe.     
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